Nonlocality is generally deemed necessary to ensure security of quantum key distribution (QKD) in the device-independent (DI) scenario. We show that some progress can be made towards DI-QKD without invoking nonlocality, via violation of the Leggett-Garg inequality (LGI) by using temporal correlations of a single qubit, which is a novel application of LGI in the area of quantum information. A key ingredient is that an LGI test certifies the identity of the transmitted particle, while the signaling character of temporal correlations can weaken the monogamy of the LGI violating property.
Nonlocality is generally deemed necessary to ensure security of quantum key distribution (QKD) in the device-independent (DI) scenario. We show that some progress can be made towards DI-QKD without invoking nonlocality, via violation of the Leggett-Garg inequality (LGI) by using temporal correlations of a single qubit, which is a novel application of LGI in the area of quantum information. A key ingredient is that an LGI test certifies the identity of the transmitted particle, while the signaling character of temporal correlations can weaken the monogamy of the LGI violating property.
Introduction. Bell's theorem [1, 2] proves that correlations between properties of spatially separated quantum systems cannot be explained by any locally pre-arranged set of value assignments. This feature of nonlocality is one of the deepest ways in which quantum mechanics (QM) deviates from classical physics. Surprisingly, it has a very practical application in cryptography. QM violates an inequality defined by the theorem-a Bell-type inequality (BI)-up to a maximum of 2 √ 2, the Tsirelson bound [3] , which is a factor √ 2 greater than the localrealist bound obtained by the above assumptions.
In QKD, distant parties (Alice and Bob) securely share a private random bit string, whose security against an eavesdropper Eve is based on quantum features like nocloning, imperfect distinguishability of non-orthogonal state. A QKD protocol was first proposed by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) [4] . In a subsequent work, Ekert [5] showed how quantum nonlocality could be used as a basis for QKD. The intuition behind achieving security in this way was that Eve's intervention would tend to disentangle particles, thereby decreasing violation of Bell's inequality. In response to the Ekert protocol, Bennett, Brassard and Mermin [6] proposed a simpler entanglement-based scheme that did not invoke Bell's theorem and showed it to be equivalent to BB84.
Here it is important to note that BB84 and all conventional QKD assume that the devices used for state preparation and measurement are well characterized, and can be trusted. This can be fatal, because correlations could be established via side-channels between the encoded state (e.g., polarization in BB84) and another degree of freedom (e.g., frequency) stored in other dimensions. This possibility of Eve as a vendor to access higher dimensions forms a new kind of threat, necessitating security proofs to be valid in the device-independent (DI) scenario. Here correlations P (a, b|x, y) shared between Alice and Bob (where a, b are their outputs and x, y the inputs) are required to violate a Bell-type inequality [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . The underlying intuition here is that correlations set up by accessing the higher dimensions will diminish the degree of nonlocality of P (a, b|x, y) by virtue of the monogamy property of nonlocal non-signaling correlations [12] .
An interesting twist to the theme of Bell-type inequalities involving spatial correlations is provided by their temporal analog, the LGI [13, 14] , where the correlations P (a, b|x, y) are obtained by sequential measurements on the same particle. The assumptions leading to LGI are that the correlated properties of the system possess definite values at the measured instant, and that these values can be accessed by noninvasive measurements. Here, a role analogous to locality in BI is played by the notion of noninvasive measurability. In recent years, there has been significant upsurge of interest about LGI, resulting in considerable theoretical [15] [16] [17] [18] and experimental [19] [20] [21] [22] works.
In this paper, we argue that sufficiently strong violation of LGI by the relevant temporal correlations of a single qubit can ensure security in the DI scenario against the type of attack discussed by Acin et al. [8] . Here invoking the DI scenario is pertinent, since otherwise, the standard BB84 is provably secure [23] . To the best of our knowledge, our present work is the first of its kind to demonstrate a specific application of LGI in the context of quantum cryptography. We note that the only other prior application of LGI in the area of quantum information was for saving memory in a quantum information processing task [24] .
Device-independence. BB84 involves Alice sending Bob particles randomly prepared in the eigenstates of the Pauli X or Z basis. Bob measures them randomly in one of these two bases. Over a classical channel, they determine the cases where their bases match, discarding the rest. On a smaller, randomly selected sample from the retained cases, Alice and Bob announce their respective outcomes to compute the error rate. Unless this rate is sufficiently small, they abort the protocol run. The statistics that arise in BB84 are: P (a = b|x = y) = 1; P (a = b|x = y) = 1 2 . Eve intercepts Alice's transmission to acquire information, but because of the information-vs-disturbance trade-off, she inevitably disrupts the BB84 statistics, which is observed by Alice and Bob. This constitutes the essential security of BB84.
Here it is implicitly assumed that Alice and Bob are measuring properties of the same particle. In the DI scenario, Eve, who is the vendor that supplies particles and devices to Alice and Bob, can cheat by having them measure different particles using, for example, the following ploy. Eve presents them the separable state [8] (|0 ± |1 ). The bracketed superscripts in the definition of ρ AB are particle labels. Eve has so arranged their devices that particles 1 and 3 (2 and 4) are with Alice (Bob). When Alice and Bob measure Z (X), they measure particle 1 and 2 (3 and 4), respectively. Notice that this reproduces the BB84 statistics, but since Eve has the 'hidden variable' of which pair they measure after their public announcement of basis, she can find out their secret bit with certainty without introducing a disturbance. Eve's cheating here hinges on the fact that Alice and Bob believe their system to be a qubit, while in fact they are accessing a system of higher (= 16) dimensionality.
The necessary condition for security in the DI scenario is that the correlations P (ab|xy) shared between Alice and Bob satisfy
since otherwise it is possible that Eve possesses a copy of the hidden variable λ, and determines Alice's and Bob's outcomes when they publicly announce x and y. This requires that P (a, b) must violate a Bell's inequality. It turns out that a sufficiently large violation guarantees security not just against a quantum mechanical Eve, but even a post-quantum Eve restricted only by no-signaling [7, 8] . The insecurity of BB84 in the DI scenario is reflected in the fact that BB84 statistics do not violate the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality
where E(x, y) is the expectation value of outcomes with inputs labelled x, y ∈ {0, 1}. Eve's cheating strategy above is static: i.e., it involves accessing arbitrarily large dimensions, but there is no uncharacterized emission of classical or quantum states from Alice's device. If the latter assumption were not made, then Alice's device could emit a bit, which suffices to reproduce not just the maximal quantum violation of (2) but also its maximal algebraic violation [25] , so that the above correlation test no longer offers security. This is especially true for prepare-and-measure protocols like BB84, which involve state transmission and no entanglement in the protocol. Thus we require a further assumption about Eve. In the semi-DI scenario, one assumes that the dimensionality of all relevant quantum systems satisfies a known upper bound. One replaces Ineq. (2) with stronger inequalities, with more settings and possibly more outcomes, which would be violated only under a classical or quantum communication of a state of dimensionality greater than the given bound. Such inequalities constitute dimension witnesses [26] , which can be used to guarantee security of prepare-and-measure QKD protocols in which relevant systems are uncharacterized, but their dimension is known to be under a bound d [27] .
The DI scenario we consider here is restricted to the type of attack on BB84 of Ref. [8] described above, which allows unbounded higher dimensions but no state emissions. Conventional DI QKD aims to guarantee the condition (1) by requiring Alice and Bob to share entanglement. This presumes that the correlations P (a, b|x, y) must be spatial. By contrast, we consider the correlations to be temporal, and require the statistics to violate LGI, which may be considered as the temporal analogue of the inequality given by Eq. (2) without requiring entanglement. Note that we are using the version of LGI where the particle state is not subjected to Hamiltonian evolution, but measurements at different instants correspond to distinct non-commuting operations, in contrast to the original proposal of the inequality involving the Hamiltonian evolution. In the form of LGI given by Eq. (2), the first correlatum in each E(·, ·) corresponds to Alice's measurement, and the second one to Bob's measurement on the same particle at a later instant. Now, consider the attack specified by cheat state ρ AB . If m and n denote the Bloch vectors of the state of two uncorrelated particles, and measurements x and y are performed on them, then the correlation is given by E(x, y) ∝ (x · m)(y · n). Such 'separable' correlations cannot violate LGI.
In other words, LGI serves as a sameness check, namely to certify that Bob is measuring on the same particle as Alice had prepared in the preceding step. However, we note that the same statistics would be obtained when the particle is substituted in the second measurement by a maximally entangled partner (in a singlet state, and modulo a local sign change). From the cryptographic perspective of generating shared private randomness, this switch is not detrimental to Alice and Bob. We may thus regard the LGI test as performing an entity authentication on a particle to ascertain that it was prepared in the previous step by Alice, but is indifferent if Bob's particle is the singlet partner of Alice's particle. (Analogously, the Bell test of a conventional DI protocol constitutes a check on dimensionality of the system.) This specifies the difference of our LGI-based scheme from conventional DI QKD.
A subtlety here is that, unlike spatial correlations, temporal correlations are signaling. This can lead to a weakening of monogamy, discussed below. In QM, the maximum signal H S possible through invasive measurement on a qubit is 0.32 bits [28] : Alice prepares her qubit in the state |0 . Eve measures it with probability α in the Z basis, and with probability 1 − α in the X ba-sis. Bob, measuring in the Z basis finds the distribution P (0|Z) = 1 and P (0|X) = 1 2 . The resulting signal from Eve to Alice-Bob is found to be (in bits) [25] :
≡ max α I(AB : E) ≈ 0.32, which characterizes qubit temporal correlations in QM. By the dataprocessing inequality, the signal will be less than the communication cost of Λ, given by C ≥ Λ 2 −1 [29] , and cannot be used to simulate the violation of LGI [25] . In a cryptographic protocol, from Eve's viewpoint, the particle is in a maximally mixed state prior to Alice and Bob's public reconciliation of bases, so that Eve's signal is zero. Thus she cannot use this information on the fly to manipulate or substitute particles to enhance LGI violation.
We note that if the device has a side-channel that leaks basis information but not outcome information, then Eve can measure in the leaked basis, thereby fully determining the secret bits without introducing noise. In this case, it appears that entanglement is necessary. An entanglement-based scheme of this sort based on intraparticle entanglement is discussed in Ref. [30] .
LG inequality: monogamy under signaling. Recent works [31, 32] have highlighted how the spatial, temporal and contextuality aspects of QM are similar in that a suitable correlation inequality is violated in all these cases. The signaling characteristic of temporal correlations arises because the pairs of correlated quantities that appear in the inequality given by Eq. (2), interpreted as LGI, are incompatible. Within QM, this incompatibility is realized as non-commutativity, but the discussions here are also applicable in a post-quantum and not necessarily non-signaling scenario.
It is known that nonclassical properties like monogamy, no-cloning can be derived from the assumptions of nonlocality and no-signaling [33] . Such features tend to diminish as the degree of signaling in the correlations rises [25] . A quantitative derivation for the decrease in intrinsic randomness due to signaling, is discussed in Ref. [34] , where signaling and randomness are shown to have the complementary behavior H I + H S ≥ 1 for CHSH/LG correlations that reach the algebraic maximum of 4. Here H I represents entropic local randomness. Now we present a simple argument to indicate why signaling and monogamy also are expected to evince such complementarity.
We will suppose that Alice and Bob share a nonsignaling correlation given by a ⊕ b = x · y, where Alice's (Bob's) input is x (y), and her (his) output is a (b). Clearly, this will violate the inequality given by Eq. (2) to the algebraic maximum of 4. If there is no monogamy bound, then Alice can share the same correlation also with Charlie, i.e., a ⊕ c = x · z, where c (z) is Charlie's outcome (input). Adding up the l.h.s of the two above equations, we find b ⊕ c = x · (y ⊕ z), which represents a 1-bit signal from Alice to Bob-Charlie, in that they can determine Alice's input from their joint data. More generally, suppose that the Alice-Bob and AliceCharlie correlations are both a mixture of a PR box (with probability µ) and a maximal local strategy (with probability 1 − µ), so that Λ AB + Λ AC ≤ 4µ + 4, where the calligraphic subscripts indicate the persons. Setting µ = 0, we obtain the no-signaling bound [35] , whereas there is no bound when µ = 1. The corresponding average signal is obtained as follows. With probability
≡ σ, they can deduce Alice's input correctly. The statistical (as against, entropic) signal S is maximal when σ = 1 and minimal for σ = 1 2 . We thus define S ≡ 2σ − 1 = µ 2 , which ranges in [0, 1]. Expressing µ above in terms of S, we obtain
showing how signaling weakens monogamy. If Λ AB + Λ AC ≡ 4(1 + x), we may define monogamy by M ≡ 1 − x (i.e., x is a measure of weakness of monogamy). It follows from Eq. (3) that M + √ S = 1, More generally, it would be possible to introduce signal even while M = 1 (cf. the example given in Ref. [36] ). We can thus generalize the above to:
giving a complementarity relation between signaling and monogamy, along the lines discussed above for intrinsic randomness. The above suggests that the monogamy for temporal correlations will be weaker than that for nonlocal correlations, and we find this indeed to be the case. For a qubit in QM, the correlations for sequential measurementsx thenŷ are given by
where α, β = ±1. Now P αβ|xŷ yields the correlator xŷ = α,β
wherex = x · σ andŷ = y · σ. The maximal quantum violation of LGI, which is the temporal Tsirelson bound, is 2 √ 2, the same as with spatial correlations and similarly achievable using the same measurement settings.
Three consecutive measurementsx,ŷ andẑ are performed at t 1 , t 2 and t 3 (t 1 < t 2 < t 3 ) respectively. Letting Π ± x denote the projector onto the subspace labelled by spin eigenvalue ±1 along direction x, the correlation for initial state ρ can be given as x,ẑ = (x · y)(y · z), so that x and z are 'disentangled' [24] x,ẑ = m,n,o=±1
This form is the same as that for measurement on a separable state of two qubits, both being pure and characterized by Bloch vector y. For separable states, Λ ≤ √ 2 [30] . If x ′ , z, x and z ′ is a set of coplanar vectors separated by angle π/4, then letting y = z is seen to achieve this bound. Thus, we have a monogamy bound for temporal correlations 'anchored' on A:
which may be compared with the tighter no-signaling bound of 4 for the CHSH inequality [35] .
LG protocol. An effect of this weakening of monogamy may be illustrated by what we call the LG protocol. On a particle transmitted from Alice to Bob, both randomly perform measurements that maximally violate LGI. Basis reconciliation is analogous to the CHSH protocol [8] : Bob announces his measurement bases, and Alice keeps her outcome information as-is except that in the last case (settings (1,1) ), where she flips her bit. Violation of Ineq. (2) guarantees that their bits will mostly be correlated. For this protocol, it can be shown that while in the nonsignaling case, it is secure with noise-tolerance, in case of the above signal-weakened monogamy, it is just secure (i.e., with zero noise tolerance) against an Eve constrained only by the monogamy (Appendix A). The use of LGI to certify the identity of Bob's particle is discussed in the protocol of the following section.
LG-BB84 protocol. We define the dichotomic qubit observables M ± ≡ 1 √ 2 (X ± Z). Alice transmits Bob randomly one of the 8 states {|0 , |1 , |± } and {|0 , |1 }, the eigenstates of M + and {± }, the eigenstates of M − . Bob randomly executes one of 4 measurements: X, Z, M ± . When Bob measures in the right basis, a secret bit is generated. However, when Alice measures in the basis X or Z and Bob measures in the bases M ± , or vice versa (LG mode), the outcome data is used to check for violation of LGI. When the bases coincide (BB84 mode), a secret bit is potentially generated. Thus, the LG mode acts as a preliminary entity authentication, certifying Bob's particle as the one Alice prepared. The BB84 mode serves to generate the secret key.
The higher-dimensional attack equivalent to cheat state ρ AB here would be: ρ such that if Alice (Bob) measures in the Z, X, M + or M − bases, then she observes particle #1, #3, #5 or #7 (#2, #4, #6 or #8), respectively. State ρ ′ AB will ensure that Eve passes the BB84 test, but maximally fail (Λ = 0) the LG test because Alice's and Bob's particles are separable and maximally mixed. For discussion of a more general attack, cf. Appendix B.
However, LG-BB84 is insecure when state emissions are allowed, even those legitimate within the protocol. For example, suppose the cheat state on Alice's uncharacterized device is Tr B (ρ ′ AB ), but Bob's device is well characterized. If Alice measures Z, she observes particle #1, but now Eve's attack has been enhanced so that Alice's device emits a copy of particle #1. Copying is not forbidden by the no-cloning theorem, because the state preparation information is available in the device. Then it is seen that the BB84 module is fully compromised even while Eve passes the LGI test.
Summary and Concluding remarks. In the conventional cryptographic scenario, where devices are trusted, standard BB84 is known to be secure. It is the possibility of mistrusted devices that necessitates using correlation inequalities beyond standard BB84 for ensuring security. In the DI scenario, for the prepare-andmeasure protocols, Eve can exploit uncharacterized devices to access higher dimensions, both of resident and emitted states, unknown to Alice and Bob. A specific attack by Eve against BB84 involving higher dimensions, but no state emissions, was discussed in Ref. [8] . The LG-BB84 scheme proposed here demonstrates that LGI can be used for protection against such an attack, essentially by certifying the identity of Bob's particle. Further, the signaling character of temporal correlations in such a scheme reveals features like the weakening of the monogamy, while the present work also indicates possible directions that may be taken beyond the no-signaling principle in the post-quantum scenario, thereby continuing a line of study already initiated [25, 34, 40] . From the perspective of experimental implementation, LGI-based DI QKD seems simpler, since it does not require entanglement generation and detection. Nevertheless, issues concerning possible experimental loopholes in such a context call for careful scrutiny.
